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1. Introduction
Throughout the 20th century up to the pres-
ent day grammar and semantics have been
uneasy bedfellows. A look at the historical
background will make it clear how this curi-
ous situation came about. 20th-century
linguistics has been characterized by an al-
most exclusive concern with the structure of
words, word groups and sentences. This con-
cern was reinforced, especially on the Ameri-
can side of the Atlantic, by the sudden rise
and subsequent dominance of behaviorism
during the 1920s. It started in psychology but
quickly permeated all the human sciences, in-
cluding linguistics, until the early 1960s,
when it collapsed as suddenly as it had
arisen.
Behaviorism was based on three premises.
First, it stated the principle that all theories
about the workings of whatever it is that one
may call the mind should be based on and
motivated by observable data drawn from
the ways in which the organisms said to be
equipped with a mind behave. Reliance on,
or reports of, private experiences are not data
in this sense and must be left out of account.
Secondly, while many forms of behavior
are directly reducible to physical causes,
many other forms of behavior are not, or at
least appear not to be. For example, passing
out after a heavy blow on the head is a form
of behavior that has a clear physical cause.
But getting red in the face after being caught
out on a lie is not so obviously reducible to a
physical cause. Those forms of behavior that
cannot be attributed to direct physical causes
form the subject of psychology, which deals
with the question of what causes these forms
of behavior.
Thirdly, when posing the question of the
causality of the latter forms of behavior,
psychology should keep to the simplest pos-
sible hypothesis. The behaviorist hypothesis
(inspired by experiments on animal behavior,
such as salivating in the sight of food) was
that the forms of behavior studied in
psychology are likewise the result of physical
causation, but indirectly, via an intervening
mechanism of associations of sensory stimuli.
Present-day psychology, in particular the
part known as cognitive science, accepts the
first two premises but denies the third, in that
nowadays the minimal hypothesis of stimulus
association is considered far too restricted to
explain the enormous variety of human be-
havior. Instead, it is now currently assumed
that the bulk of human behavior is the result
of complex computational processes carried
out by the brain, mostly below any threshold
of awareness. It is even widely, but not uni-
versally, assumed that what used to be called
‘the mind’ should, in principle, be reducible
to a set of computationial mechanisms in the
brain. In the context of behaviorism it thus
became highly unfashionable, if not down-
right anathema, to talk about the mind in any
of its manifestations, including cognition.
In linguistics, this created an atmosphere
in which anything to do with meaning was
looked at with suspicion. One was willing
to accept that something like ‘meaning’ is
probably there in language, but it was not
considered to be a legitimate object of scien-
tific investigation. A truly scientific linguis-
tics should look exclusively at the forms oc-
curring in language and language use, and
disregard meaning altogether.
2. A generative grammar
as an algorithm
In this climate, a grammar of a language L
came to be seen as the set of rules and prin-
ciples that define all and only the well-formed
combinations of the morphemes of L (for
a historical re´sume´ of this development,
J 238). In most cases, the domain within
which these rules and principles were defined
was the sentence, although various authors,
such as Hjelmslev (1943/1953) or Harris
(1952), went beyond the sentence and ex-
plored the possibility of defining all and only
the well-formed combinations of morphemes
within a text or discourse. Experience has
taught us, however, that it is the sentence, not
the text or discourse, that forms the universe
of grammar. There is no valid concept of
‘(un)grammaticality’ for texts or discourses.
Instead, texts or discourses are coherent or
incoherent, and the principles that make a
text or discourse (in)coherent are of a totally
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different nature from those that make senten-
ces (un)grammatical.
Through the works of Bloomfield and
Harris, this led to the concept of generative
grammar. A generative grammar is a formal-
ism that defines precisely which combina-
tions of morphemes of a language L form
grammatical sentences. This concept of
grammar was supported by then recent devel-
opments in mathematics, where, during the
1920s, the notion of algorithm had been ex-
tended beyond its traditional boundaries.
Traditionally, an algorithm is a system for
the computation of additions, subtractions,
multiplications and divisions of numbers.
The word algorithm derives from the by-
name al Hø ua´rizmi, “the man from Hø ua´rizm”
(ancient Chorasmia, now Uzbekistan), of the
9th-century mathematician-astronomer Mu-
hamed ibn Mu¯sa, who developed our cus-
tomary ways of doing addition, subtraction,
division and multiplication with the help of
the Arabic number system including the digit
zero. From the 12th century on, this form of
arithmetic gradually gained ground, first in
Sicily and Southern Spain, then in the rest of
Europe, where the term alguarismus (still in
Spanish guarismo “number”) became algoris-
mus, later garbled into algorithmus, owing to
a confusion with the Greek word arithmo´s
‘number’.
During the 1920s mathematicians became
aware that the original notion of algorithm
has, in fact, a much wider application (see
Rosenbloom 1950). The notion was thus ex-
tended to cover any formally well-defined
system consisting of a finite sequence of me-
chanical instructions each acting upon input
strings of symbols of a certain type and pro-
ducing output string of symbols. When the
input string of symbols is null, the algorithm
is a primitive algorithm. Otherwise it is de-
rived. The input to a derived algorithm may
itself be characterizable by means of an algo-
rithm, recursively, until a null input is arrived
at. But a derived algorithm may also act
upon an input that is not algorithmically
characterizable, either because of the limited
means available at any given time, or in prin-
ciple.
Thus defined, the notion of algorithm is
extremely general (there are at present about
six million references to ‘algorithm’ on the in-
ternet). In fact, it became the central notion
in computer science. In the more limited per-
spective of linguistics, however, algorithms
are typically used either to characterize a
‘language’, in the sense of ‘set of string of
symbols’, or to analyze and assign a structure
to any input string in the ‘alphabet’ of some
‘language’, and thus to decide in a finite
number of steps whether the input string
does or does not belong to the ‘language’ in
question. The former class of algorithms are
generative algorithms, the latter are called de-
cision algorithms or parsers. A ‘language’ (set
of strings of symbols) that can be generated
by a primitive algorithm, with or without
subsequent derived algorithms, and which
can also be parsed by a decision algorithm is
called a decidable ‘language’. A ‘language’
that can be generated from null but cannot
be parsed by automatic procedure is called a
recusively enumerable or canonical ‘language’.
A ‘language’ that can neither be generated
nor parsed is noncanonical (see Seuren 1998:
267279). (It is generally assumed among
mathematicians that a noncanonical ‘lan-
guage’ is chaotic and therefore without inter-
est. Whether this is indeed so, is, however, a
moot point. It is not to be excluded that the
set of all possible propositional thoughts,
though representable as a set of strings of
symbols and thus as a ‘language’, will turn
out not to be recursively enumerable and
hence to be noncanonical. It seems wiser,
therefore, to reserve judgement on the ques-
tion of whether noncanonical ‘languages’ are
with or without interest.)
As shown in J 217, the work by Bloom-
field and Harris led straight up to a view of
grammar as a primitive generative algorithm.
This view of grammar has been the hall-mark
of generative grammar till the present day. It
is implicitly assumed that natural languages
are canonical but not decidable. That is, it is
assumed that it is possible to generate all and
only the sentences of any natural language L
by algorithmic procedure, but the question of
whether it is possible to decide, in a finite
number of steps, for any given string S made
up of symbols of any natural language L,
wether S is a sentence of L, is left open.
In computational linguistics, by contrast,
it is generally assumed that natural languages
are decidable, and the algorithms developed
in those circles are mostly of the parsing type.
It is uncertain whether the more daring posi-
tion of computational linguistics will turn out
to be tenable. So far, all attempts at develop-
ing fully automatic parsers have systemati-
cally foundered on the fact that in many in-
stances an appeal must be made to users’
nonformalized world -or situational knowl-
Brought to you by | Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - WIB6417
Authenticated | 192.87.79.51
Download Date | 3/14/13 12:47 PM
2203232. Sentence-oriented semantic approaches in generative grammar
edge. No such systematic barrier has been en-
countered in work on the generative side,
where the problems are of a totally different
nature. It may well be, therefore, that natural
languages are canonical but not decidable.
The fact that competence in a language im-
plies the carrying out of parsing procedures
on sentences (at some deeply buried noncon-
scious level of operation) as part of the inter-
pretation process, may well be attributable to
the human capacity to draw on all kinds of
knowledge as a support for formal computa-
tional procedures present in the brain. In
natural life, the parsing process would then
not be compositional, but co-dependent on
support by available knowledge sources.
Only when the totality of human knowledge
and cognition has been caught in terms of
fully formalized algorithmic procedures, will
there be sufficient grounds for calling natural
languages decidable. So far, however, this
ideal is still way beyond our reach. (A similar
problem besets work in machine translation.)
An example of a toy system for the primi-
tive algorithmic generation of a few English
sentences is the following:
(1) (i) S J NP  VP
(ii) NP J Det ( A)  N
(iii) VP J V  NP
(iv) Det J {the, a}
(v) N J {mouse, cat}
(vi) V J {ate, caught, chased}
(vii) A J {black, big, quick}
The start symbol ‘S’ of instruction (i) is the
null input. The arrows instruct the user (or
the machine) to print the symbols to its right,
in the order given, underneath the symbol
that stands to its left, which has been printed
before, and draw connecting lines. Round
brackets around a symbol indicate optional-
ity. Curly brackets indicate that one of the
elements enclosed must be selected. The sym-
bols to the right of an arrow are the expan-
sion of the symbol to its left. The start symbol
‘S’ thus expands into the small bit of tree
structure shown in (2a). Further expansions
generate, for example, the tree structure (2b),
corresponding to the sentence The big cat
chased a quick mouse. A system of generative
instructions of the expanding type exempli-
fied in (1) is generally known as a Phrase
Structure grammar or PS-grammar. PS-























At first, it was hoped that a PS-grammar
would do the job of generating all and only
the wellformed sentences of a natural lan-
guage. Harris soon realized, however, in the
late 1940s, that it would not be sensible to
attempt to implement such a research pro-
gram. A more intelligent method would be to
exploit the many systematic correspondences
between sentence types. For example, active
sentences and their corresponding passive
forms show systematic structural relations.
Likewise for affirmative sentences and their
corresponding questions, or positive and
negative sentences. It would, therefore, make
sense to let a PS-grammar generate the sim-
pler of a pair of related sentence types, and
then add a derived algorithm that would pro-
duce the other, less simple, sentence type, or
would combine several primitive sentence
types into one larger, complex one. The sen-
tences generated by the primitive PS-gram-
mar were called kernel sentences. The added
derived algorithm was called the transforma-
tional component of the grammar, producing
transformed sentences. This was the birth of
transformational generative grammar or
TGG. One may put its birth-date around the
year 1950.
Harris (1951) has no notion of transforma-
tion yet: its text had been rounded off in
1947, as the Preface tells us. In his subse-
quent publications, however, starting with
1952 (for a complete collection of the rel-
evant papers, see Harris 1981), the notion gets
further developed and more and more re-
fined. The first refinement consisted in drop-
ping the notion of kernel sentence and replac-
ing it with that of deep structure. Instead
of letting a PS-grammar generate a fully
equipped surface structure, with all the mor-
phological and other trimmings, it seemed
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wiser to let the PS-grammar deliver an unfin-
ished product called ‘deep structure’ (DS)
and feed that into a compulsory system of
transformations that would deliver a surface
structure one way or another. Thus, for ex-
ample, a sentence like (3a) would have some-
thing like (4a) as its DS. The passive trans-
formation would produce (4b). A common,
generalized procedure would then be applied
to both (4a) and (4b), yielding (3a) and
(3b), respectively.
(3a) The cat has chased the mice.
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The older ‘horizontal’ notion of trans-
formation was thus replaced by the newer
‘vertical’ notion some time during the 1950s.
The result was a TGG model of the type
shown in Fig. 232.1.
Around that time, the influence of contem-













Fig. 232.1: The overall structure of a TGG around
1960
This was rather a new element in the study
of language, introduced mainly by Noam
Chomsky. According to Chomsky, a genera-
tive grammar of a language L should be seen
as a theory of L, making explicit the intuitive
notion of grammaticality or wellformedness,
which enables speakers to distinguish be-
tween grammatical and ungrammatical sen-
tences. This speaker’s ability was then termed
competence in L.
Very quickly, however, it began to be ob-
served that this was a little too fast. If a
‘theory of L’ is to make explicit the native
speaker’s competence in L, it should involve
a great deal more than just the ability to dis-
tinguish between grammatical and ungram-
matical sentences. It makes no sense to say
that some being or machine that has just a
generative and/or a decision algorithm of L
is competent in L. A competent speaker also
knows what the sentences of his language
mean. Any theory of L, therefore, should en-
compass also a formal account of the mean-
ings of the sentences of L. In other words,
philosophical reflection on the nature of for-
mal grammars called the semantic chickens
home to roost.
3. The semantic component
In their 1963 paper, the philosophers Katz
and Fodor proposed that a formal algorith-
mic grammar of the type envisaged should be
extended with a semantic component, which
should take as input given syntactic struc-
tures and deliver something like a semantic
analysis (SA) of the sentence at hand. The se-
mantic component would thus be a derived
algorithm, meant to give a formally explicit
account of the competent speaker’s ability to
understand and interpret the sentences of
his language.
There were, however, some serious difficul-
ties which the 1963 article was unable to
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solve. The first question was how to deter-
mine what kind of syntactic structures should
be taken as input to the semantic component.
Katz & Fodor proposed that both deep struc-
tures (DS) and surface structures (SS) should
qualify. Yet their arguments for making that
choice were at best flimsy.
The second, even more serious, problem
was how to specify the format of the seman-
tic component’s output: what does a semantic
analysis look like? Here again, Katz & Fodor
failed to provide a satisfactory answer. It was
not until McCawley’s articles of the late
1960s that this question was unequivocally
answered.
Then, the uncertainty regarding the format
of SAs inevitably led to a quandary over the
format of the algorithmic instructions mak-
ing up the semantic component. For when it
is not known what the output should look
like, it cannot be known either what the in-
structions should amount to. The 1963 article
by Katz & Fodor was thus shrouded in mys-
tery. But it did call attention to the fact that
linguistic competence is more than just an
ability to separate grammatical from un-
grammatical sentences. The Katz & Fodor
1963 model of a grammar-cum-semantic
component is shown in Fig. 232.2.
The first question mentioned above was



















Fig. 232.2: Katz & Fodor (1963); Chomsky’s post-
1970 ‘Extended Standard Theory’
pher Katz and the linguist Postal in 1964.
This book is an extended argument to show
that it is only the DS, not the SS, that should
be considered the legitimate input to the se-
mantic component. The leading argument
was as follows:
If it is assumed that only deep structures are input
to the semantic component, so that the trans-
formations cannot have a semantic effect on the
sentence under generation, then this assumption
will have an overall simplifying effect on the syntax
of the language in question.
A few examples will illustrate this. Until 1964
it had been customary among transforma-
tionalists to insert the negation (not) trans-
formationally. Katz & Postal, however, fol-
lowing Klima (1964) where the same pro-
posal is made, point out that there is a range
of syntactic phenomena triggered by the ne-
gation, including the possible occurrence of
negative polarity items (NPIs). If not is in-
serted transformationally, it will be difficult
to provide a unified account of all the syntac-
tic phenomena triggered by it. But if not is
part of the DS, then one can, in principle,
let it trigger the entire range of phenomena
dependent on it in the transformational com-
ponent. This will unify and simplify the syn-
tactic description of the language. It also
means that the semantically highly significant
element ‘negation’ will have found a place in
the deep structure, and that, in this respect at
least, the transformational component has no
semantic effect. (Later studies, e. g., Seuren
1969, showed that the mere presence of not
in the DS is not sufficient; its precise scope
must also be specified.)
Similar reasoning is applied to the impera-
tive mood. It had been generally assumed
among transformationalists that imperatives
would have to be generated by the trans-
formational insertion of an element ‘IMP’,
which would then trigger the shaping of the
sentence under construction into an impera-
tive form. Katz & Postal, however, showed
that imperatives differ from other sentence
types not only in the imperative verb form
and the absence of a subject term, but in
other respects as well. First, imperatives re-
quire an underlying second person subject
and an auxiliary will, as appears from reflexi-
vization phenomena and tags, respectively:
(5a) Wash yourself! / *Wash himself!
(5b) Wash yourself, will you! / *Wash your-
self, do you!
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Then, certain adverbs cannot occur in im-
peratives:
(6a) *Perhaps wash yourself! / He will per-
haps wash himself.
(6b) *Fortunately wash yourself! / He fortu-
nately washed himself.
The argument is that if the element IMP for
‘imperative’ is given an appropriate place in
the DS of an imperative, together with the
requisite second person and the auxiliary will,
then the occurrence in imperatives of any of-
fending adverbs can be prevented by ensuring
that these adverbs will not co-occur, in DS,
with IMP. All the transformations then have
to do is assign to the sentence under genera-
tion its appropriate surface structure. Trans-
formations are then nothing but merely for-
mal re-arrangements of sentence structures
and will not affect meaning.
These and other arguments of a similar na-
ture suggested that, if there should be a se-
mantic component, it should be fed exclu-
sively by DS. A grammar model integrating
a semantic component would then be like the
model shown in Fig. 232.3, still with the un-
certainties regarding the nature of SAs and
the format of the instructions in the semantic
component. This model, with uncertainties
and all, was adopted for a short while by
Chomsky, who adhered to it in Aspects
(Chomsky 1965).
As regards the remaining uncertainties,
James McCawley quickly came to the rescue.
In a number of publications McCawley
(1967, 1970b, 1972) showed that SAs must
themselves be linguistic structures. These
should be cast in the mould of the symbolic
language current in modern predicate logic 
a conclusion independently reached in Seuren
(1969: 219224). Moreover, since SAs must
themselves be taken to be linguistic struc-
tures, they can be represented as constituent
trees. This again means that the semantic
component’s instructions be transforma-
tional in nature, since they transform DS tree
structures into SA tree structures.
This insight gave rise immediately to the
question of the ways in which DSs and SAs
could be assumed to differ. One began to
wonder what arguments would motivate a
distinction between DS and SA levels of rep-
resentation of sentences. The answer was
quick: no arguments were available to main-
tain that distinction. It was hence concluded















Fig. 232.3: Katz & Postal (1964) and Chomsky
(1965)
be collapsed. What had been taken to be the
form of DS representations should at the
same time be reckoned to be the SA of any
sentence under generation. Exit the semantic
component.
The collapsing of DS and SA was revolu-
tionary in many ways, not all of which could
be suspected at the time. The general feeling
at the time was that, finally, syntax and se-
mantics were being united again, as they had
been during the whole history of linguistics
till the advent of structuralism and behavior-
ism in the early years of the 20th century. As
from 1965, a new movement arose, which
was soon called: Generative Semantics. Its
main protagonists were the linguists James
McCawley, George Lakoff, John Robert
(‘Haj’) Ross, and Paul Postal, and the phi-
losopher Jerrold Katz, with lateral support
from Jerry Fodor and a few other philoso-
phers. In a couple of years’ time generative
semantics swept the linguistic world. Yet it
maintained its overall dominant position for
no more than a decade: around 1975 a con-
servative counterrevolution, led by Noam
Chomsky, had regained dominance and gen-
erative semantics was declared dead. It would
take too long to describe and analyze this cu-
rious and historically unique development in
detail here. (See Seuren 1998: 493527, for
an extensive discussion.) Unfortunately, New-
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meyer (1980) is not reliable, as shown in
McCawley (1980); its second edition of 1986
fares no better. Suffice it to quote from
Huck & Goldsmith’s admirable study (1995:
ix):
But while the Generative Semanticists unquestion-
ably faced theoretical obstacles of various sorts,
there are also good reasons to believe that the de-
mise of their program was not a consequence of
theoretical weakness. Indeed we will argue in what
follows that it is not possible to find, internal to the
idea of Generative Semantics as it was evidently
originally understood by Lakoff, McCawley,
Postal and Ross, adequate grounds to explain its
widespread abandonment in the 1970s. We will be
concerned to evaluate the linguistic evidence on its
own terms, paying particular attention to the theo-
retical assumptions that underlay the various cri-
tiques, and will conclude that one must turn to ex-
ternal explanations to account adequately for what
transpired. But although external factors undoubt-
edly affected the way that the various proposals in
the dispute were understood and received, we
would also suggest that a focus on the relatively
dramatic personal and social aspects of the interac-
tions in which the participants were involved has
tended to obscure the conceptual significance of
the positions they took.
Be all that as it may, it must be emphasized
that the ideas that came to the fore in the
context of generative semantics implied a
radical departure from the well-established
overall parameters that had been taken to de-
fine the notion of grammar since Bloomfield
(1933), Harris (1951), and Chomsky (1957).
In the established view, a grammar is an algo-
rithmically organized random sentence gen-
erator meant to characterize precisely the set
of well-formed sentences of a language. Let
us call this the random-generator of grammar.
By contrast, generative semantics was
quickly leading to a view in which a grammar
is a transformational device mediating be-
tween cognitively produced thoughts on the
one hand and well-formed linguistic surface
structures on the other. Let us call this the
mediational view of grammar.
Speaking in realistic terms of actual cogni-
tive processing, the mediational view places
the infinitely creative power of a language
not in the language itself, as the random-gen-
erator view does, but in cognition. The fact
that a language must be treated as an infinite
set of possible sentences is not denied in the
mediational view. What is denied is that the
cause of the infinity of language must be
sought in language itself. In the mediational
view, the cause of the infinity of language lies
in the fact that cognition is able to produce
an infinite variety of different propositional
thoughts. All language has to do is make sure
that each such product is expressed in a natu-
ral language sentence. And clearly, in order
to do that, language needs a machinery that
allows for infinitely many different combina-
tions of morphemes into sentences (and also
for infinitely many different combinations of
sentences into texts). The development of
generative semantics thus announced a radi-
cal paradigm shift in linguistics, from a ran-
dom-generator to a mediational perspective.
As from 1970, Chomsky did all he could to
prevent such a paradigm shift, in which he
was not playing a leading role, from happen-
ing.
But let us revert to the details of the devel-
opment. The collapsing of DS and SA natu-
rally placed the syntactic generator or PS-
grammar in a completely different light. A
PS-grammar now became a system defining
or producing structures belonging to predi-
cate logic and it somehow looked very odd
to regard such a system as a random sentence
generator. It was much more natural to es-
tablish a link with cognition and interpret the
DS/SA structures as the products of so far
unexplored and largely mysterious thought
processes, thereby reinforcing the realist in-
terpretation of the model. Yet many felt that
it was too hazardous, in a period when be-
haviorism was still on everybody’s mind, to
speak openly of ‘thoughts’ and ‘cognitive
processes’. Noncommittal talk of ‘logic’ was
a great deal more secure. Even so, it was uni-
versally felt that these new ideas were bring-
ing the structural study of language closer to
the study of cognition and that this meant a
more organic integration of linguistics into
the wider group of human sciences as well as
a return to tradition.
In this context it was both relevant and
opportune to drop the notion of a PS-gram-
mar as a random algorithmic syntactic gener-
ator and redefine a PS-grammar as a set of
structural constraints on the form of the con-
stituent trees embodying the DS/SA repre-
sentations. This idea was formally elaborated
in McCawley (1968). (One also notes the
opening sentence in McCawley (1970a): “The
contents of this paper is clearly transforma-
tional grammar but not so clearly generative
grammar.”) If only one had the courage
to venture the leap to cognition, a PS-gram-
mar could be regarded as a mere corollary
to the overall cognitive procedure of casting
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thoughts into the format of DS/SA represen-
tations.
This leap was never taken by McCawley,
who stayed within the boundaries of logic, no
matter how ill-defined the relation of logic
was with regard to cognition. Others, how-
ever, did venture the leap. Katz, for example,
wrote (1966: 98):
Roughly, linguistic communication consists in the
production of some external, publicly observable,
acoustic phenomenon whose phonetic and syntac-
tic structure encodes a speaker’s inner, private
thoughts or ideas and the decoding of the phonetic
and syntactic structure exhibited in such a physical
phenomenon by other speakers in the form of an
inner, private experience of the same thoughts or
ideas. Behavioristically oriented investigations of
linguistic communication focus exclusively on the
publicly observable aspects of communication situ-
ations: speech sounds, nonverbal behavior or the
participants in the situation, and physical proper-
ties of available stimuli. Thus, such investigations
neglect the essential aspect of successful linguistic
communication, the congruence of speaker’s and
hearer’s thoughts and ideas that results from ver-
bal exchanges.
Fodor (1976) went further, trying to be more
definite on the question of what thoughts are
made of. Reviving certain Ancient and Medi-
eval views, he proposed that what we may
reasonably call ‘thought’ is also a ‘language’
of some special kind (Fodor 1976: 68):
One way of describing my views is that organisms
(or, in any event, organisms that behave) have not
only such natural languages as they may happen
to have, but also a private language in which they
carry out the computations that underlie their be-
havior. I think this is a fair characterization of
what I have been saying, but I recognize that some
philosophers would take it to be a reductio ad ab-
surdum argument.
In this view, a grammar is indeed a trans-
ducer taking thought structures as input and
delivering surface structures as output. But
even for those who did not, or not fully, ac-
cept Fodor’s position on the nature of
thought, it was becoming clear that the input
to the grammar machinery of a natural lan-
guage should be taken to be a mental product
created by so far unknown or badly under-
stood processes of thought.
Great store was set, at the time, by what
was called prelexical syntax, the internal
analysis of semantically complex predica-
tives. Following proposals made by McCaw-
ley, there was a sudden rash of ‘prelexical’
analyses. McCawley had proposed, in
McCawley (1967) and other papers, that the
English verb kill should be analysed as
‘cause-to-become-dead’. This analysis would
then be subject to an internal cyclic trans-
formation called Predicate Raising (PR),
which would yield a V-cluster that would be
a candidate for lexicalisation as kill. The pro-
cedure is illustrated in (7a)(7c).
One of the claims of prelexical syntax was
that the internal lexical processes of unifica-
tion under a single categorial node (V) were
identical to transformational processes found
in the ‘open’ syntax of languages. This was
denied by Chomsky, who claimed (1972: 142)
that the rule of Predicate Raising lacked em-
pirical support: “… the unit that is replaced
by kill is not a constituent, but it becomes
one by the otherwise quite unnecessary rule
of predicate raising.” It was then found, how-
ever (Seuren 1972; Evers 1975) that Chomsky
was wrong, as French, Italian, Dutch, Ger-
man, Japanese, Turkish and many other lan-
guages have PR as a strongly supported rule
in their ‘open’ syntax.
Prelexical syntax also claimed that the
transformational processes of prelexical and
‘open’ syntax should be taken to be intermin-
gled: McCawley-type prelexical syntax denied
that any ‘deep structure’ level should be as-
sumed at which all surface lexical items have
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Fig. 232.4: The Generative Semantics model (( 1970)
been filled in. The only ‘deep’ level of repre-
sentation, SA, was said to have only ‘primi-
tive’ lexical items filled in. The surface items
were taken to be as much the result of trans-
formational processes as the rest of surface
structure. This second proposal has not car-
ried the day, mainly because it became clear
that prelexical analyses of the kind exempli-
fied in (7a)(7c) fail to do full semantic jus-
tice to the replacing surface lexical items. It
is now widely accepted that, although pre-
lexical syntax probably makes a great deal of
sense, it whould not be taken to be a part
of ‘open’ syntax. It is, therefore, advisible to
assume that any semantic level of representa-
tion is, in principle, equipped with the surface
lexical items of the sentence in question. Any
further ‘internal’ analysis should be relegated
to the lexicon.
The overall model of grammar adopted by
the generative semanticists thus looks as in
Fig. 232.4. The ‘thought’ section at the top
of the diagram has been placed between
square brackets to indicate that this part is
not even close to a formal treatment yet and
must, for the moment, be taken at face value.
As has been said above, generative seman-
tics was overrun by Chomskyan grammar
during the first half of the 1970s. After 1975
none of the protagonists continued to work
according to the research program inherent
in generative semantics. The only linguist
who has steadfastly held on to the media-
tional paradigm as it resulted from generative
semantics, renaming it Semantic Syntax, has
been Seuren, in a series of publications till
the present day (see in particular Seuren
1996).
But what happened in the main theater of
theoretical linguistics? During the late 1960s
Chomsky realized that his 1965 position,
which was in principle that of Katz & Postal
(1964), shown in Fig. 255.3 above, was unten-
able and would, if maintained, inevitably lead
to the generative semantics position as it was
being developed and promoted by a group of
new protagonists. Since this was in any case
unacceptable, he had to change his position.
The change was, however, presented as a fur-
ther development. Having called the 1965 po-
sition the ‘standard theory’, he gave the name
‘extended standard theory’ or EST to his new
position (Chomsky 1972). The extension,
however, consisted, in fact, in a reversal to
the Katz & Fodor position of 1963 depicted
in Fig. 232.2 above.
In contrast to Katz & Fodor (1963), how-
ever, Chomsky did produce arguments to
support the thesis that semantic interpreta-
tion is a question not only of deep structure
but also of surface structure. The semantic
elements that, according to him, should be
derived from the surface structure rather
than from the deep structure of a sentence
were of two kinds: (a) contrastive accent and/
or topic-focus modulation and (b) scope dif-
ferences corresponding to the linear order of
scope-bearing semantic operators.
As regards contrastive accent and/or topic-
focus modulation, Chomsky’s argument was
(1972: 99100):
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Rules of phonological interpretation assign an in-
tonational contour to surface structures. Certain
phrases of the surface structure may be marked, by
grammatical processes of a poorly understood sort,
as receiving expressive or contrastive stress, and
these markings also affect the operation of the
rules of phonological interpretation. If no such
processes have applied, the rules assign the normal
intonation. In any event, phrases that contain the
intonation center may be interpreted as focus of
utterance, the condition being perhaps somewhat
different and more restrictive when the intonation
center involves expressive or contrastive stress, as
noted.
This, however, did not take into account the
fact that contrastive or focus accent is some-
times impossible and sometimes obligatory,
in both cases under semantically controlled
conditions. Such facts inevitably put paid to
the contention that contrastive or focus ac-
cent is a matter of surface structure inter-
pretation.
Consider, for example, (8a) and (8b) (Seu-
ren 1974: 187):
(8a) I don’t believe Tom has yet seen the
problem.
(8b) *I don’t believe Tom has yet seen the
problem, Fred does.
Although (8a) is a grammatical English sen-
tence, (8b) is not. The reason for the ungram-
maticality of (8b) is clearly semantic, since
(8b) corresponds to the semantically more ex-
plicit but equally ungrammatical ‘*the one
who believes that Tom has yet seen the prob-
lem is not me but Fred’. Clearly, the negative
polarity item yet is the offending element: it
requires a negation within the believe-clause,
not outside it and over the cleft construction
that corresponds with the contrastive accent.
On the other hand, contrastive accent is
obligatory in a sentence like (9a). The corre-
sponding (9b), without the contrastive (fo-
cus) accent, is ungrammatical as it requires
the reflexive myself:
(9a) I didn’t teach me, YOU did.
(9b) *I didn’t teach me.
Again, the reason is to do with the semantic
analysis of (9a), which corresponds to ‘the
one who taught me is not me but you’, which
is well-formed and does not require reflexivi-
zation of me. Without the cleft construction,
reflexivization is obligatory.
As regards operator scope differences as
expressed in the linear order of their surface
representatives, it had been noted by a vari-
ety of authors (e.g., Jackendoff 1969, Seuren
1969, Lakoff 1971, McCawley 1972) that, as
a matter of principle though not as an abso-
lute rule, higher scope operators precede
lower scope operators in surface structure, as
is shown by the following examples:
(10a) Nobody here knows two languages.
(10b) Two languages are known by nobody
here.
In most academic surroundings, (10a) will be
false while (10b) will be true. The difference
lies in the different scopes of the underlying
logical operators not, someone, and two. In
the normal interpretation of (10a) the logico-
semantic order is not-someone-two, whereas
(10b) is normally interpreted with the order
two-not-someone. Many more such exam-
ples could, of course, be given.
Following Jackendoff (1969), Chomsky
maintains that “the scope of negation will be
determined by the position of not in surface
structure” (1972: 104), extending this to other
logical operators as well. The point is, how-
ever, that the scope-order correspondence (if
taken to be an absolute principle) works both
ways. In sentence comprehension, the listener
will take the surface structure as point of de-
parture and reconstruct the logico-semantic
scope of whatever scope-sensitive operators
occur in a sentence on the basis of their linear
order. In sentence production, however, the
logico-semantic structure, with scope ex-
pressed in the SA as a command relation, is
cast into a surface structure with the opera-
tors ordered linearly according to their scope.
Clearly, if one takes a generative point of
view with regard to an algorithmical gram-
mar, the latter arrangement, from SA to SS,
is the more natural one.
Proposals as to how to relate SA-scope
with linear order in SS were made in Seuren
(1969), Lakoff (1971) and McCawley (1972;
in circulation since 1969). These proposals
amounted to a transformational treatment in
terms of a rule or process of Operator
Lowering, according to which an operator,
once lowered into the matrix-S, was ‘flagged’,
so that any subsequent operator would have
to stay on its left, if allowed to do so by the
rest of the grammar. That the grammar does















Brought to you by | Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - WIB6417
Authenticated | 192.87.79.51
Download Date | 3/14/13 12:47 PM
2211232. Sentence-oriented semantic approaches in generative grammar
(11b) English:
*I understood one word not.
Sentence (11a) is perfectly good German and
is unambiguously interpreted as saying that
there is one word which the speaker failed
to understand. The scope-ordering constraint
requires one to precede not in surface struc-
ture, which is possible in German, where the
negation is lowered to the far right of the ma-
trix-S, unless stopped by a previously low-











In English, however, not is lowered onto the
verb of the matrix-S (normally with do-sup-
port), or onto a following existential or a pre-
ceding existential or universal quantifier.
(13a) I found no mistake.
(13b) No mistake escaped him.
(13c) *I found not all mistakes.
(13d) Not all mistakes were found.
Given these restrictions on the lowering of
not in English, it follows that (11b) is un-
grammatical and its semantic content must
be expressed by different means.
Apart from such complications, however,
one may consider the possibility that the
scope-order correspondence of logico-seman-
tic operators can be handled either way: from
SA to SS or vice versa. In fact, May (1977)
proposed a machinery, entirely in the spirit
of Chomsky’s EST, to raise operators from
SS to their position in the corresponding SA
(called ‘logical form’ by the Chomskyans).
The machinery proposed was a simple rever-
sal of the lowering machinery proposed by
Lakoff, McCawley and others, yet no attri-
bution was made to the generative semantics
literature on the subject, a curious omission
that caused some surprise at the time.
The EST position was, therefore, not very
strong. Around 1980 Chomsky changed posi-
tion again, now in a direction as far away
from generative semantics as possible: se-
mantic interpretation was now considered to
be grafted onto SS exclusively, to the exclu-
sion of DS, as shown in Fig. 232.5. The new
theory went under a variety of names, here
summarized as the ‘post-EST position’. It
was in force from roughly 1980 till 1995,














Fig.: 232.5: Chomskyan post-EST grammar
(( 1980 till ( 1995)
Even before EST passed into post-EST,
McCawley’s argument that SAs should be re-
garded as linguistic structures cast into the
language of modern predicate logic had be-
come accepted, but, again, without any attri-
bution. The term ‘logical form’ (LF) was in-
troduced to stand in for ‘semantic analysis’
or ‘semantic representation’.
Again, however, the post-EST position
turned out to be unstable. For it turned out
to be systematically the case that DS and LF
were either identical or so close to each other
that the distinction between the transforma-
tional and the semantic component, and
hence between DS and LF, became highly
questionable. An appeal to the different ‘di-
rectionality’ of either component was ruled
out, as Chomsky had ruled in (1972) that di-
rectionality of rule systems was just a nota-
tional matter.
An example will illustrate this. Consider
the sentence (14a):
(14a) John is likely to win.
(14b) s[ s[John  win] VP[be likely]]
This would be transformationally derived
from an underlying DS roughly correspond-
ing to (14b), meaning ‘that John win is
likely’. However, that is also what the sen-
tence means, so that the same (14b) is not
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only the underlying syntactic structure but
also the resulting LF. It thus looked as if the
old argument raised by the generative seman-
ticists kept haunting the random-generator
linguists.
In 1995 Chomsky published his book The
MinimalistProgram, where the position is
changed again. It would take us too far to go
into the details of how ‘logical form’ is
treated there (see Seuren 2004 for a critique).
In the present context it should be sufficient
to refer to Johnson & Lappin (1997), who
point out that the minimalist notion of ‘logi-
cal form’ is entirely undefined and, to the ex-
tent that it can be reconstructed, unintelligi-
ble. It would seem, therefore, that the latest
version of the Chomskyan random-generator
approach to grammar and meaning is farther
removed than ever from a satisfactory con-
clusion.
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1. Leonard Bloomfield (18871949)
1.1. Introduction
Indigenous and European influences came
together, most notably through the work of
Noah Webster (17581843), William Dwight
Whitney (18271894), and Ferdinand de
Saussure (18571913) to shape 20th-century
linguistics in America. Alongside the already
rich and diverse philological traditions rep-
resented by these scholars, anthropology had
already exerted its influence through Franz
Boas (18581942) and Edward Sapir (1884
1939) when The Linguistic Society of Amer-
ica was formed in 1924, under the presidency
of Leonard Bloomfield. The behavioral
psychology of John B. Watson (18781958)
took root in the 1920s, and had become so
potent a force by the 1940s that it played a
role in the profound misunderstanding over
Bloomfield’s views on the place of meaning
in linguistics. Believing that he advocated the
study of language without meaning, linguists
committed themselves to this position.
Bloomfield himself decried this as a trend
that would “injure the progress of our science
Seuren, Pieter A. M. 1998. Western Linguistics: An
historical introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
Seuren, Pieter A. M. 2001. A View of Language:
Collected papers 19721999. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Seuren, Pieter A. M. 2004. Chomsky’s Minimalism.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Steinberg, Danny D. & Leon A. Jakobovits, eds.
1971. Semantics: An interdisciplinary reader in phi-
losophy, linguistics and psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pieter Seuren, Nijmegen (The Netherlands)
by setting up a fictitious contrast between
students who consider meaning and students
who neglect or ignore it. The latter class, so
far as I know, does not exist” (Fries
1954: 160). Charles Carpenter Fries (1887
1967) attempts to set the record straight, and
Charles F. Hockett, Bloomfield’s chief dis-
ciple, makes an unconvincing argument in
defence of his mentor’s position (Hockett
1968: 22ff.), but neither provides a compre-
hensive perspective of Bloomfield on mean-
ing. The need for such a perspective becomes
apparent when we recall that from his early
studies at the universities of Göttingen and
Leipzig prior to World War I, Bloomfield had
learned the methodology of the Junggram-
matiker and contemporary psychology. This
training accounts for the substantial empha-
sis that Bloomfield gave to historical linguis-
tics  an emphasis that came to be balanced
by a synchronic approach to the study of lan-
guage, under the influence of Saussure.
1.2. Bloomfield’s Definition of Meaning
No misprision of Bloomfield’s thought would
have arisen unless he had, albeit unintention-
ally, created the impression of shunning
meaning. How then? By excluding the use of
meaning from the method of analysis and de-
ferring the treatment of meaning as an object
of analysis. Consequently, Fries (1954: 58),
like Hockett (1968), is unable to buttress his
defence with explicit references from Bloom-
field’s writings, quoting instead from Zellig
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